Spatial dynamics can promote the evolution of cooperation. While disper-5 sal processes have been studied in simple evolutionary games, real-world social 6 dilemmas are much more complicated. The public good, in many cases, does 7 not increase linearly as per the investment in it. When the investment is low, for 8 example, every additional unit of the investment may help a lot to increase the 9 public good, but the effect vanishes as the number of investments increase. Such 10 non-linear behaviour is the norm rather than an exception in a variety of social as 11 well as biological systems. We take into account the non-linearity in the payoffs 12 of the public goods game as well as the natural demographic effects of population 13 densities. Population density has also been shown to impact the evolution of co-14 operation. Coupling these non-linear games and population size effect together 15 with an explicitly defined spatial structure brings us one step closer to the com-16 plexity of real eco-evolutionary spatial systems. We show how the non-linearity in 17 payoffs, resulting in synergy or discounting of public goods can alter the effective 18 rate of return on the cooperative investment. Synergy or discounting in public 19 goods accumulation affects the resulting spatial structure, not just quantitatively 20 but in some cases, drastically changing the outcomes. In cases where a linear 21 payoff structure would lead to extinction, synergy can support the coexistence of 22 cooperators and defectors. The combined eco-evolutionary trajectory can thus 23 be qualitatively different in cases on non-linear social dilemmas. 24 Keywords: non-linear interactions, spatial dynamics, pattern formation, social dilemma, 25 synergy and discounting effect 26 1 157 are taken into account, the resulting outcomes might often be different from what is 158 naively expected [Gokhale and Hauert, 2016]. In this manuscript, we have extended 159 186 the Max Planck Society. 187 References 188 Athena Aktipis. Principles of cooperation across systems: from human sharing to 189 multicellularity and cancer. Evolutionary Applications, 9(1):17-36, 2016. 190 M. Archetti. Cooperation as a volunteer's dilemma and the strategy of conflict in public 191 goods games. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 11:2192-2200, 2009. 192 13 M Archetti and I Scheuring. Co-existence of cooperation and defection in public goods 193 games. Evolution, 65(4):1140-1148, 2010. 194 M Archetti and I Scheuring. Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social 195 dilemmas without assortment. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 299(0):9-20, 2012. 196 R. Axelrod. The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York, NY, 1984. 197 L A Bach, T Helvik, and Freddy Bugge Christiansen. The evolution of n-player co-198 operation -threshold games and ESS bifurcations.
1 Introduction 27 The most significant impact of evolutionary game theory has been in the field of social 28 evolution since a simple two player game [Axelrod, 1984] and its multiplayer version, 29 the public goods game [Hardin, 1968] can represent the so-called social dilemma. 30 The social dilemma arises when the behaviour (or choice) of an individual result in 31 the conflict between the benefits of the individual and the group it belongs to. From 32 decision making to biological behavioural strategies, the prisoner's dilemma and pub-33 lic goods games have invited interdisciplinary studies from behavioural economists, 34 cognitive scientists, psychologists, and biologists providing a fertile field for experi- 35 mental as well as theoretical developments. While cooperative behaviour raises the 36 group benefit, cooperators get less benefit than the others who do not cooperate aris- 37 ing a social dilemma. When interactions take place in a social setting where more 38 than two individuals are involved, social dilemmas can arise in different categories. 39 The different possible dilemmas have been categorically defined on a continuum of 40 the so-called non-linear public goods games [Hauert et al., 2006b] as explored before 41 by [Eshel and Motro, 1988] in the context of helping behaviour. We call the situation 42 where the group benefit is linear in the number of cooperators linear social dilemma, 43 and non-linear social dilemma is named after their non-linearity. Depending on the 44 appropriate social context, it is possible that a variation of the social dilemma is more 45 or less appropriate [Skyrms, 2003] . Archetti and Scheuring [2012] present an excel-46 lent review of the use and importance of non-linear public goods game. Interestingly, situations impossible in two player games can occur in multiplayer games which can 48 drastically change the evolutionary outcome [Bach et al., 2006 , Pacheco et al., 2009 , 49 Souza et al., 2009 , Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010 , Venkateswaran and Gokhale, 2018 . 50 Of the many postulated solutions to the problem of evolution of cooperation, one 51 of them is spatial structure. Spatial structure can be represented in different forms 52 such as grouping, explicit space, deme structures and other ways of limiting inter-53 actions [Wright, 1930 , Ohtsuki et al., 2007 , Tarnita et al., 2009 , 2011 , Hauert and 54 Imhof, 2012 . Especially in the repeated version of the public goods game, includ-55 ing an assortment mechanism promotes cooperation [van Veelen et al., 2010 [van Veelen et al., , 2012 . 56 In an explicitly defined space, diffusion dynamics of cooperators and defectors sup-57 port the existence of cooperators by forming spatial patterns. Comparable to the 58 activator-inhibitor systems from the classical studies on morphogenesis by Turing 59 [Turing, 1952] , we can see various patterns with cooperators in the simplified system 60 taking into account the linear social dilemma and constant diffusion [Wakano et al., 61 2009]. Previously we have combined a linear social dilemma with density-dependent diffusion coefficients [Park and Gokhale, 2019] which comes closer to analysing real 63 movements seen across species from bacteria to humans [Okubo and Levin, 1980 , 64 Shigesada et al., 1979 , Kawasaki et al., 1997 , Lou and Martínez, 2009 , Loe et al., 65 2009 , Ohgiwari et al., 1992 , Grauwin et al., 2009 . However, as introduced, non-linear 66 social dilemmas have not been previously discussed in this context. Furthermore, 67 public goods games are typically analysed in an evolutionary framework but devoid 68 of the ecological context. Studying social dilemmas have been taken in an ecological 69 context where along with the evolutionary change, the population dynamics are also 70 tracked [Hauert et al., 2006a , Gokhale and Hauert, 2016 , Park and Gokhale, 2019 . 71 In this study, we aim to take the ecological context into account in non-linear social 72 dilemmas. 73 In this paper, keeping the diffusion coefficient constant, we study ecological non-74 linear public goods games in a spatial dimension. We begin by introducing non-75 linearity in the payoff function of the social dilemma, including population dynamics. 76 Then we include simple diffusion dynamics and analyse the resulting spatial patterns. 77 For the parameter set comprising of the diffusion coefficients and the multiplication 78 factor, we can observe the extinction, as well as heterogeneous, or homogenous Complexity of evolutionary games increases as we move from two-player games to 92 multiplayer games [Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010] . A similar trend ensues as we move 93 from linear public goods games to non-linear payoff structures [Archetti and Scheur-94 ing, 2012]. A handy method for moving from linear to non-linear multiplayer games is 95 given in Hauert et al. [2006b] . To introduce this method in our notational form, we will 96 first derive the payoffs in a linear setting. 97 In the classical version of the public goods game (PGG), the cooperators invest c to the common pool while the defectors contribute nothing. The value of the pool increases by a certain multiplication factor r, 1 < r < N , where N is the group size. The amplified returns are equally distributed to all the N players in the game. For such a setting the payoffs for cooperators and defectors are given by,
where m is the number of cooperators in the group. As in Hauert et al. [2006a] we are interested in not just the evolutionary dynamics (change in the frequency of cooperators over time) but the ecological dynamics as well (change in the population density over time). This system, analysed by Hauert et al. [2006a Hauert et al. [ , 2008 , is briefly re-introduced in our notation for later extension. We characterise the densities of cooperators and defectors in the population as u and v. Thus the population density ranges as 0 ≤ u + v ≤ 1 and the vacant space remaining in the niche is w = 1 − u − v. Low population density means that it is hard to encounter other individuals and accordingly hard to interact with them. Hence the group size N , the maximum group size in this case, is not always reachable. Instead, S individuals forming an interacting group. With fixed N the interacting group size S is bounded, S ≤ N , and the probability p(S; N ) of interacting with S − 1 individuals is depending on the total population density u+v = 1−w. When we consider the focal individual, the probability p(S; N ) of interacting with S − 1 individuals among a maximum group of size N − 1 individuals (excluding the focal individual) is,
Then, the average payoffs for defectors and cooperators, f D and f C , are given as,
where P D (S) and P C (S) are the expected payoffs for defectors and cooperators at a 98 given S. The sum for the group sizes S starts at two as for a social dilemma there 99 need to be at least two interacting individuals. 100 To derive the expected payoffs, we first need to assess the probability of having a certain number of cooperators m in a group of size S − 1 which is given by p c (m; S),
(4)
Thus the payoffs in Eq. (1) are weighted with the probability of having m cooperators, giving us the expected payoffs,
where the investment cost c has been set to unity without loss of generality ( c = 1).
The average payoffs f D and f C are thus given by,
As in Hauert et al.
[2006b] the parameter Ω can introduce the desired non-linearity in the payoffs as,
If Ω > 1, every additional cooperator contributes more than the previous, thus providing a synergistic effect. If Ω < 1, then every additional cooperator contributes less than the previous, thus saturating the benefits, thus providing a discounting effect. Following the derivation, as earlier [Gokhale and Hauert, 2016] , the average payoffs are given as,
The linear version of the PGG can be recovered by setting Ω = 1. 101
Spatial non-linear public goods games 102
For tracing the population dynamics, we are interested in the change in the densities of cooperators and defectors over time. Both cooperators and defectors are assumed to have a baseline birth rate of b and death rate d. Growth is possible only when the population is not at carrying capacity i.e. w > 0. We track the densities of cooperators and defectors by an extension of the replicator dynamics [Taylor and Jonker, 1978 , Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998 , Hauert et al., 2006a ,
To include spatial dynamics in the above system we assume that a population of cooperators and defectors resides in a given patch. Game interactions only occur within patches, and the individuals can move adjacent patches. The patches are on a two-dimensional space and are connected in the form of a regular lattice. Taking a continuum limit, we get the differential equations with constant diffusion coefficients for cooperators D c and defectors D d , With Ω larger than unity increasing r, and vice versa. As shown in Fig. 1 , for synergy 110 effect (Ω = 1.1), we can find a chaotic coexistence of cooperators and defectors. The ., 2009] . Mint green and Fuchsia pink colours are used for the cooperators and defectors densities, respectively. For a full explanation of the color scheme we refer to the Appendix A. Black indicates no individual on the site whereas blue appears when the ratio of cooperators and defectors is the same. Initially, a disk with radius L/10 at the centre where L is the system size is occupied by cooperator and defector densities 0.1, respectively. We use multiplication factor r = 2.2 and diffusion coefficient ratio D = 2. Throughout the paper, for simulations, we used the system size L = 283, dt = 0.1 and dx = 1.4 with the Crank-Nicolson algorithm.
Homogeneous coexistence
Diffusion induced instability
Diffusion induced coexistence D = 8 r = 2.44 Figure 2 : Synergy and discounting effects on pattern formation. We get the different patterns under discounting and synergy effects distinct from the linear PGG game at a given the same parameter set. While diffusion induced instability is observed in the linear PGG, the discounting effect makes diffusion induced coexistence pattern implying that the discounting effect makes the Hopf bifurcation point shift to the larger value. Under the synergy effect, on the contrary, we obtain the opposite trend observing the homogenous coexistence pattern. In the linear PGG, the homogenous patterns are observed in higher multiplication factor r implying the shift of r hopf to the smaller value under the synergy effect. The frame colors are matched with corresponding phases explained in Fig. 3 .
The change in the resulting patterns due to synergy or discounting is not limited to 116 extinction of chaos but is a general feature of the non-linearity in payoffs. . 3 ).
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The effective r increases with an increasing Ω, and thus the location of the Hopf 123 bifurcation also shifts. As a result of shifting r hopf , extinction region is reduced in 124 the parameter space with synergy effect. We thus focus our attention on the Hopf 125 bifurcation point r hopf . 126 127 We find the Hopf bifurcation point r hopf for various Ω values using Eq. (8). Effective 128 r increases as Ω increases, and thus r hopf is monotonically decreasing with Ω as in 129 Fig 4(a) . The tangential line at Ω = 1 is drawn for comparing the effects of synergy and 130 discounting. If we focus on the differences between the tangent and r hopf line, synergy 131 changes r hopf more dramatically than discounting. Synergy and discounting effects 132 originate from 1 + (1 ± ∆Ω) + (1 ± ∆Ω) 2 + · · · + (1 ± ∆Ω) m−1 in Eq. (7), where ∆Ω > 0 133 and plus and minus signs for synergy and discounting, respectively. Straightforwardly, 134 the difference between 1 and (1 + ∆Ω) k is larger than that of (1 − ∆Ω) k for k > 2. 135 Hence, the non-linear PGG itself gives different ∆r hopf for the same ∆Ω. 137 Since Ω changes effective r value, the phase boundary also moves. By using the linear stability analysis, we find phase boundaries between diffusion induced instability and homogeneous coexistence phases in r-D space shown in Fig. 4(b) . To do that, we introduce new notations, and two reaction-diffusion equations in Eq. (10) can be written as Figure 3 : (a) Spatial patterns and (b) corresponding phase diagram for Ω = 1.1. There are five phases (framed using different colors): extinction (black), chaos (blue), diffusion induced coexistence (red), diffusion induced instability (green), and homogeneous coexistence (orange). The Hopf-bifurcation point r hopf 2.2208 and the boundary between diffusion induced instability and homogeneous coexistence are analytically calculated, while the other boundaries are from the simulation results. All boundaries and r hopf shift to the left indicating effective r increases as compared to a linear public goods game (see Fig. 4 ). The Hopf bifurcation point r hopf for various Ω (solid line with points). Synergy (Ω > 1) decreases r hopf while discounting (Ω < 1) increases r hopf . By decreasing r hopf , the surviving region is extended in the parameter space. The solid line without points is a tangential line at Ω = 1. (b) The phase boundaries between diffusion induced instability and homogeneous coexistence phases are also examined for various Ω.
Hopf-bifuraction in non-linear PGG

Criterion for diffusion induced instability
Since r hopf increases as decrease with Ω, the boundaries also move to the right.
We assume that the solution is 141 a fixed point, and examine its stability under diffusion.
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If we consider small perturbationũ from the homogeneous solution, u ∼ = u 0 +ũ, we get the relation, The condition for det(B) < 0 is given by
multiplication factor r ratio of di↵usion constants D r hopf (⌦ = 1) r hopf (⌦ = 0.9) r hopf (⌦ = 1.1) ⌦ = 1.1 ⌦ = 1.0 ⌦ = 0.9 r Figure 5 : Schematic figure for expected shift of phase boundaries. According to the change of r hopf , over all phase boundaries may shift together at the same direction. As we have seen in Fig. 4(b) , the phase boundary with r hopf move to the right with discounting effect and move to the left with synergy effect, respectively. Accordingly, the surviving region in the parameter space expands with synergy effect while it shrinks with discounting effect.
It can be rewritten as following form
If the above criterion is satisfied, the stable fixed point predicted without diffusion 150 becomes unstable due to diffusion. From this criterion, we get the analytic phase 151 boundary for r hopf < r as shown in Fig. 4(b) . Again, such economies of scale [Dawes et al., 1986] can be justified in both bac-169 terial as well as human interaction as proxies for quorum quenching or accruing of 170 wealth (or austerity) [Archetti, 2009 , Archetti and Scheuring, 2010 , Peña et al., 2015 . Similar to the colour coding used in Park and Gokhale [2019] we use mint green (color code: #A7FF70) and Fuchsia pink (color code: #FF8AF3) colors for denoting the cooperator and defector densities respectively for each type. The colour spectrum and saturation is determined by the ratio of cooperators to defectors which results in the Maya blue color for equal densities of cooperators and defectors. For convenience, we use HSB color space which is a cylindrical coordinate system (r, θ, h) = (saturation, hue, brightness). The radius of circle r indicates saturation or the color whereas θ helps us transform the RGB space to HSB. The total density of the population ρ = u + v is represented by the brightness h of the color. For better visualization, we formulate the brightness h as log aρ + 1 log a + 1 , (A.1)
where a control parameter a (> −1 and = 0) (see Fig A.1) . The complete color 292 scheme so developed passes the standard tests for colourblindness. 
